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Abstract
A large amount of mobile applications (Apps) are uploaded, distributed and
updated in various Android markets, e.g., Google Play and Huawei App-
Gallery every day. One of the ongoing challenges is to detect malicious Apps
(also known as malware) among those massive newcomers accurately and e-
ciently in the daily security management of Android App markets. Customers
rely on those detection results in the selection of Apps upon downloading,
and undetected malware may result in great damages. In this paper, we pro-
pose a cloud-based malware detection system called SaaS by leveraging and
marrying multiple approaches from diverse domains such as natural language
processing (n-gram), image processing (GLCM), cryptography (fuzzy hash),
machine learning (random forest) and complex networks. We rstly extract
n-gram features and GLCM features from an App's smali code and DEX le,
respectively. We next feed those features into training data set, to create a
machine learning detect model. The model is further enhanced by fuzzy hash
to detect whether inspected App is repackaged or not. Extensive experiments
(involving 1495 samples) demonstrates that the detecting accuracy is more
than 98.5%, and support a large-scale detecting and monitoring. Besides,
our proposed system can be deployed as a service in clouds and customers
can access cloud services on demand.
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1. Introduction
In recent years, smart phones have become increasingly popular. In An-
droid market, a large number of Apps are uploaded or updated by hundreds
or thousands of individual developers for App distribution everyday. A re-
cent report shows that the number of Apps in Google play has increased
nearly 30% since 2017 [1]. While various Apps bring convenience and enter-
tainment to our daily life, Apps with malevolent intentions (e.g. malicious
deductions) also inict troubles and risks to customers. Indeed, the growing
amount of malware has become an urgent problem. According to a report
released by the QIHU 360 security center, the number of malware samples in
the Android platform had surged to nearly 18.74 million by December 2015,
which was 27.9 times and 5.7 times higher than that in 2013 and 2014, re-
spectively [2]. The report also points out that over 370 million devices were
infected. The above results give us an intuitive emergence on the severity of
malware rampant on the Android platform.
Recently, detecting Android malware has been intensively studied [3, 4,
5, 6, 7, 8, 9], which are divided into two major categories: dynamic anal-
ysis [8, 9] and static analysis [3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. The former refers to obtain
dynamic behavior features of Apps when executing Apps in real devices over
sandbox environment. However, it usually time costly to nd malicious be-
haviors, and may lose some harmful behaviors in a limited scope. Thus,
dynamic analysis is not not suitable for detecting malware among massive
Apps. In other words, the desired solution should be able to detect malware
automatically, eciently and accurately. In contrast, static analysis aords
higher eciency, fast processing, and full code coverage without relying on
the compiler or execution environment, thus it is more scalable for massive
malware detection. Nevertheless, static analysis may not be able to detect
harmful dynamic behaviors, and possibly results in relatively lower accuracy
when extracted features are not sucient.
To tackle these limitations, we propose to obtain dynamic behavior fea-
tures by using some methods that can be conducted automatically and scal-
ably, e.g., n-gram sequences, GLCM features, and so on, to extract sucient
features in detection to improve the accuracy.
Our design goal is to build a malware detection system for processing
massive Apps, with high processing throughput and high accuracy. This
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paper makes following contributions: We propose a machine learning based
Android malware detection system. The system can automatically crawl new
samples from App markets, which guarantees the training set is fresh and
realistic. Even the most recently upcoming malware can thus be detected.
To further improve detection accuracy, we employ comprehensive methods
including n-gram, fuzzy hash, GLCM (Gray-level Co-occurrence Matrix) and
complex networks. Furthermore, we conduct extensive experiments to evalu-
ate system performance. The experimental results show that the system can
achieve 98.5% detection accuracy. For repackaged Apps, our system achieves
96% detection accuracy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Previous works are reviewed
in Section 2. We present the pre-processing methods in Section 3 and propose
the scheme design in Section 4. Evaluation is conducted in Section 5, and
the paper is concluded in Section 6.
2. Related Work
Android App malware detection methods fall into two categories: dy-
namic analysis [8, 9], and static analysis [3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. As intensive compu-
tation resources are required, some detection systems are deployed in clouds
[10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15], in which both static analysis and dynamic analysis
methods are used.
The basic idea of dynamic analysis methods [8, 9] is to obtain runtime
features of Apps and to rely those features in detection. M. Apel et al.[8]
proposed a dynamic analysis scheme to optimize distance measurement for
grouping malware samples. Their scheme can gain satisfactory results, but
its long analyzing time (over 2 minutes) may not be acceptable for a large
scale malware analysis. L. Zeng et al. [9] proposed to encode a matrix with
a low rank into a watermark graph and to embed the graph statements into
smali code.
Static analysis methods [3, 4, 5, 6, 7] leverage specic information from
inspected App, such as information from AndroiManifest.xml le or some
special API calls. The syntactic approach can be used for detecting mal-
ware. M. Karim et al. [3] investigated the frequency of n-gram from the
Opcode of instruction in the binary code, which can distinguish standard
vector based distance. The n-perm are utilized as features to dierentiate
two malware samples, which, however, is unavailable due to the existence of
many morphing techniques beyond instruction permutation. Similarly, based
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on Kolmogorov Complexity of malware, S. Wehner [4] leverages normalized
compression distance (NCD) to assess the similarity of malware samples,
where the complexity is approximated by the compressibility of malware
samples. Nevertheless, such clustering approach is vulnerable to the morph-
ing techniques due to its syntactic nature.
Apart from the syntactic-based approach, P. Faruki et al. [5] proposed a
malware detection system based on improbable feature signature database
of known malicious Apps. Regardless of their given positive results, their
scheme may not be preferable for the large scale data analysis, and may
not be able to nd out newest malware. The malware detection system
proposed by Y. Zhang et al. is based on the vetting permission in Apps [6],
and their scheme could eectively examine the internal sensitive behaviors
of Apps by monitoring permission behaviors. K. Rieck et al. developed an
automatic classication system for malware samples, where classier labels
samples by using anti-virus products [7]. In the scheme, samples unknown
to the anti-virus products are classied as unknown. On the other hand, it
also renders their scheme to be applied for categorizing malwares. V. Kelesj
et al. proposed a method for authorship attribution based on character-level
\n-gram" author proles [16]. Their method is based on byte-level \n-gram"
and thus the generated author proles are subjected to size limitation. The
internal connection are lost in their scheme and thus it may result in failing
to detect malwares. The study proposed by Patodkar Vaibhavi et al. uses
information from Twitter as a corpus for sentiment analysis [17]. The \n-
gram" is also used to analyze the messages together with some classiers to
sort out the message type.
S. Yerima et al [12] employed Bayesian classication to characterize App's
type with 58 features. The training set included 1000 malware samples from
49 families and 1000 benign samples. They further improved their work by
using static method with ensemble machine learning [13]. They extracted 179
features from APPs which include API calls, commands, and permissions.
They tested 6863 applications (2925 malware and 3938 benign samples) with
multiple methods such as naive Bayes, simple logistic, and random tree. The
experiment results showed a detection rate up to 97-99%.
F. Narudin et al. used public dataset and private dataset to evaluate
malware detection with machine learning classier [14]. Based on the eval-
uation results, Bayes network and random forest classier both have more
accuracy readings with a 99.97% true-positive rate, and multi-layer percep-
tion with only 93.03% on MalGenome dataset. Besides this, they found that
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k-nearest neighbor classier eciently detected the latest Android malware
with 84.57% true positive rate, which is higher than other classiers.
Overall, above schemes [8, 9, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7] suer from some problems
in processing massive Apps with high accuracy, so in this paper, we use
comprehensive static analysis methods together with machine learning to
detecting malware. Besides, we deploy the system in clouds to accelerate the
speed of processing massive data.
3. Preliminaries
In our system, inspected App is pre-processed by three algorithms in the
preparation stage:
 Fuzzy hash algorithm: We use fuzzy hash algorithm to distinguish
whether the evaluated App is repackaged.
 N-gram: We extract App's n-gram features from App's smali code and
feed features to train models to detect App's characteristics.
 GLCM: We extract App's GLCM-6 features from the graph created
from App's Dex le as model to detect App's characteristics.
3.1. Fuzzy Hash Algorithm
Fuzzy hash algorithm, also known as Context Triggered Piecewise Hash-
ing (CTPH), rstly are used as a weak hash algorithm to calculate content,
and the hash value of each piece is calculated by a strong hash algorithm
again. Afterwards, the pieces of hash values are combined together to form
a fuzzy hash string. The similarity comparison algorithms can be used to
assess the similarity of two objects, i.e., documents, by comparing the fuzzy
hash values. We employ it to evaluate the similarity of les (e.g. the dier-
ences among les with content addition or content deletion). In our system,
we compare the data extracted from related Apps to evaluate their similarity
for determining whether those Apps are repackaged.
3.2. Smali and N-gram
Smali is a tool for studying bytecodes in Dalvik Virtual Machine (DVM).
Note that, although Smali language is not an ocial standard, almost all
statements in Apps follow this syntax specications. As there are over 200
types of instructions in Dalvik Opcode, we need to classify and streamline
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the instructions. Thus, we remove the non-essential instructions. There are
only 7 core instructions (i.e., M, R, G, I, T, P, V) left and they represent
the operations of \move", \return", \goto", \if", \get data", \put data" and
\invoke", respectively.
Table 1: Dierent n-gram features from an assembly le in Smali format
Smali Format Instruction Classify and Describe
iput-object p1,p0... P(input-object)
Invoke-direct fp0g... V(invoke-direct)
Return-void.... R(return-void)
iget-object V0,P0.... T(iget-object)
Invoke-staticfV0g... V(invoke-static)
Return-void... R(return-void)
Opcode 1-gram Opcode 2-gram Opcode 3-gram Opcode 4-gram
P PV PVR PVRT
V VR VRT VRTV
R RT RTV RTVR
T TV TVR
V VR
R
N-gram is used in natural language processing and it assumes that the
probability of a word showing only relies on its previous n   1 words. This
probability can be obtained by a sucient amount of sentences in a corpus.
For example, the word of \apple" or \pizza" is more likely to appear after
\eating" than the word of \road". We could perceive that n-gram remains
some linguistic features. Therefore, n-gram can be exploited for analyz-
ing malicious code [18], whose method was based on the bytecodes. But,
it is supposed that Opcode-based method was better than bytecode-based
method [19]. We incorporate the Opcode-based method in our scheme. The
Opcode n-gram can be extracted from instruction Opcode and n can be as-
signed as 2, 3 or 4. Tab. 1 gives an example of Opcode n-gram from an
assembly le.
In the system, we extract features from DVM Opcode to constitute a
training set, relying which machine learning is conducted to create a detection
model for a large scale malware detection.
3.3. Gray-scale image and GLCM
For a binary le, each byte is ranged from 00~FF, it corresponds to gray
values from 0 to 255 (0 represents black pixel and 255 denotes white pixel).
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We can convert a binary le into a matrix, whose elements are corresponded
with bytecodes in the le and the size can be adjusted accordingly. The
matrix can then be easily transformed into a gray-scale image composed by
pixels.
Gray-scale image of an App can show features on code execution, which
can be used to explore code similarity and related patterns. Fig. 1 shows
two gray-scale images in the same malware family. Both are created from
DEX le, and we can see the similarity in image patterns by vision intuitively.
Certainly, diverse image processing methods can be applied for further image
analysis for similarity and pattern recognition.
Fig. 1: Comparison of two gray-scale images in the same malware family. Some similarity
in image patterns can be observed.
Gray level co-occurrence matrix (GLCM) is dened as the tabulation of
occurring times for dierent combinations of pixel brightness values (grey
levels) in an image. The GLCM is usually used for a series of \second order"
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texture calculations. First order texture measures are statistics and calcu-
lated from original images. Second order measures consider the relationship
between groups of two (usually neighboring) pixels in original images.
GLCM-6 represents the six largest eigenvalues of characteristics in GLCM,
i.e., Contrast, Homogeneity, Correlation, Dissimilarity, ASM, and Entropy.
We can extract the data from DEX le to form a gray-scale image, from
which GLCM-6 values can be extracted as features to building a training
set.
4. Proposed Scheme - SaaS
The proposed scheme consists of three major functions: network data
capture and feature extraction, repackage detection, and code classication.
The input process output (IPO) model of the system is depicted in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2: The IPO (input process output) model of the system.
4.1. App Capture and Feature Extraction
4.1.1. App capture
We custom-tailor crawling codes via python for a large scale App crawling
from Android application markets. The crawled Apps will further be decom-
piled to obtain their n-gram sequences and GLCM information. We prefer
to collect more samples in this procedure to establish a better training set
(i.e. more features of Apps can be learned), which can improve the accuracy
in future machine learning procedure.
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4.1.2. App ngerprint recording
App ngerprint is recorded by following major steps: Extract the instruc-
tion sequences of DEX les; Attain a sequence of simplied instructions;
Process sequence via fuzzy hash algorithm to record App ngerprint. Fuzzy
hash algorithm outputs the hash value of each section related to sequences,
which will not be inuenced by most modication operations such as adding
or deleting instructions. The specic tool can be selected for providing fuzzy
hashing function, e.g., SSDEEP, which can compare similarity strength be-
tween candidate les.
4.1.3. N-gram extraction
We use Baksmali to process APK le to output corresponding smali
source code. All smali les will rstly be examined and then seven criti-
cal instructions, i.e., M, R, G, I, T, P, V, are selected and extracted. We
code a Python program to slice the list to produce the corresponding n-gram
sequences. In our system, we assign N = 3 as the length of feature sequence.
Some samples of 3-gram are illustrated in Tab. 1.
More specically, extracting n-gram characteristics mainly presents fol-
lowing functions: Decompile APK le of an APP; Create an ALLsmali le
which encloses the contents of all smali les in each folder (those folders are
all come from one APK); Obtain le named F.smali (here F is the index
of the order, which is identical with App order in decompiling) to extract
the simplied instructions; Generate le named FSEQ.txt by converting in-
structions into instruction codes; Create le named n-gram.txt that contains
n-gram features of designated App by extracting n-gram from instruction
codes.
4.1.4. Feature extraction from gray-scale image
As we have mentioned previously that a binary le can be easily converted
into a gray-scale image, we convert the data extracted from DEX le to a
gray-scale image. MATLAB's GLCM funtion in Java environment will be
invoked to compute GLCM-6 values from the gray-scale image.
The GLCM-6 values describe following six features for a given gray-scale
image [20].
 Contrast reects intensity dierence between a pixel and its neighbors
over the whole image, which is dened as
Con =
X
i
X
j
(i  j)2P (i; j) (1)
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where i and j represent gray value of pixels in an image and P (i; j) is
the probability that both pixel i and j are at specic position.
 Homogeneity reects the closeness of element distribution in GLCM
to GLCM diagonal, which is dened as
Hon =
X
i
X
j
P (i; j)
1 + ji  jj (2)
 Correlation reects the statistical measure on how a pixel is correlated
to its neighbors over whole image, which is dened as
Corr =
X
i
X
j
ijP (i; j)  12
12
(3)
where 1 =
P
i
P
j iP (i; j), 2 =
P
i
P
j jP (i; j), 1 =
P
i(i 1)2
P
j P (i; j),
and 2 =
P
j(j   2)2
P
i P (i; j):
 Dissimilarity reects the dissimilarity between two pixels, which is
dened as
Dis =
X
i
X
j
ji  jjP (i; j) (4)
 Angular Second Moment (ASM) reects the summation of squared
elements in GLCM, which is dened as
Asm =
X
i
X
j
P (i; j)2 (5)
 Entropy reects the complexity and the inhomogeneous degree of an
image, which is dened as
Ent =
X
i
X
j
P (i; j) logP (i; j) (6)
A training set is constructed by combining the data from n-gram and
GLCM-6. Relevant procedure is illustrated in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 3: The ow chart of forming the train set.
4.2. Repackage Detection
Repackage detection is employed in our system, in which two folders are
considered: the similarity of App ngerprint between inspected two Apps,
and the certicate of App. Although repackaged App has dierent certicates
from original App, most functions in it remain similarity.
Our system collects many certicated App's ngerprint. When a raw
App sample from markets is crawled, App ngerprint will be computed and
stored. The ngerprint will then be compared with the other ngerprints
which are stored before. If there exists a ngerprint which is highly similar
to the detected ngerprint and the certicate is distinct with the detected
one, the detected App is very likely to be repackaged one and will be assigned
a score denoted as scoreR. The ngerprint of the repackaged App will be
removed.
4.3. Code Classication
The code classication process intends to identify Apps that contain mali-
cious codes. A suspected strength in percentage that indicates the possibility
of an App to be malware is assigned to each evaluated App. It will be au-
tomatically labeled as \normal" or \malware" by the classier according to
pre-setting threshold. Two thresholds are assigned in our system based on
our empirical results from experiments on code classication. A specic App
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is regarded to be malware, if its strength percentage is larger than ; An
App is probably to be malware, if that percentage is larger than  but lower
than .
The classication method is based on random forest. In our experiments,
the test of binary classication reports an accuracy 99.5987%. (Correctly
Classied Instance 1489, Incorrectly Classied Instance 6, Kappa statistic
0.992, Mean absolute error 0.0293, Root mean squared error 0.0775, Rel-
ative absolute error 5.866%, Root relative squared error 15.5187%) After
above detections, each App will be assigned a score denoted as scoreC =
scoreN + scoreG, where scoreN is a n-gram score, and scoreG is a gray-scale
image score. If an App is labeled by classier as \malware", socreN is set
to a negative value, whose absolute value equals probability calculated from
machine learning results. In contrast, if an App is labeled by classier as
\normal", scoreN will be set a positive value. scoreG is set similarly.
We hereby briey give an example on classier by n-gram. Firstly, all
Smali les are obtained from an APK by using Baksmali, and they are merged
into a new le named AllSmali. The system then retrieves all Opcodes orderly
from AllSmali and these Opcodes will be simplied. The n-gram method is
employed to count the amount of 3-gram sequences, which will be dumped if
the amount is larger than 300. The system then obtains the n-gram features
of the APP as a le. We further create a test model that learns from n-gram
features of other Apps, using random forest technique to classify the App
(\malware" or \normal"). scoreN of the App will be assigned according to
the results of classier. Features of analyzed App will be included into the
test model for model upgrading.
4.4. Enhancement Method
To better analyze behaviors of an APP, we further propose an enhance-
ment method based on complex networks to characterize features on func-
tion calling graph, and then combine the n-gram information of features with
multiple metrics borrowing from complex networks, e.g., degree, average clus-
tering coecient, average path length, to contribute features set in classier
model.
4.4.1. Function calling graph
We use FlowDroid to create a graph about an App's function calling.
FlowDroid is an open source static analysis tool for Android Apps, which can
output a graph which starts at function named \dummyMain", and connects
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all invoked functions in the App. The le named graph.gexf is created by
Flowdroid, which is a graph containing nodes and edges. Nodes present
API names and function names. Edges present source node information and
target node information.
An App may call some safe SDK (Software Development Kit) to simplify
the coding process, same development time, and reduce bugs. However, it
increases the diculties in analyzing internal behaviors of Apps. Because
certain SDK libraries may call sensitive APIs, false positive may increase
due to auditing those sensitive APIs. Thus, we need to reduce the false
alert from SDK libraries, such as Alipay SDK, BaiduMap SDK, and so on.
Besides, we also need to remove common advertisement libraries to increase
the accuracy of the detection. In our experiments, we remove 75 common
advertisement libraries, such as com.google.android.gms.ads, net.cavas.show,
com.adsmogo.adview, net.youmi.android, et al.
The specic method to remove some safe SDK libraries and common ad-
vertisement libraries is show in Alg. 1. It takes as input 3 les - graph.gexf,
node sdk.dot and node sensiti.dot. Here graph.gexf le is created by using
FlowDroid, node sdk.dot lists the names of safe SDK libraries and adver-
tisement libraries, and node sensiti.dot contains names of sensitive APIs. In
graph.gexf the names of safe SDK libraries and advertisement libraries are
shown in nodes and edges, so it is easy to remove nodes or edges which pos-
sess those names. By using Alg. 1, we obtain a simplied function calling
graph.
4.4.2. Get sensitive APIs information
In this section, we dene sensitive APIs that will be used in complex
networks. We use TF-IDF (Term Frequency - Inverse Document Frequency)
method to dene sensitive APIs.
Denition 1. Sensitive API. The API that occurs more in malware but less
in normal Apps will be regarded as a sensitive API.
In Android environment, developers need to write some permissions in
AndroidManifest.xml le to call some specic APIs. Thus, we can comb
sensitive permissions in AndroidManifest.xml to reveal sensitive APIs.
Denition 2. Sensitive Permission. The permission that occurs more in
malware but less in normal Apps will be regarded as sensitive permission.
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Algorithm 1 Remove some safe SDK libraries and common advertisement
libraries
Input: graph:gexf; node sdk:dot; node sensiti:dot
Output: edge.dot
1: function RmWght(graph:gexf)
2: for each node from edge in graph.gexf do
3: if node contains node sdk.dot then
4: erase(node); // erase the node information from original le
5: function SimlifyEdges(node)
6: erase(edge);
7: node node:target;
8: SimlifyEdges(node);
9: end function
10: elsenode contains node sensiti.dot
11: edge:weight 2;
12: end if
13: end for
14: end function
We use APKtool to dig permissions from 757 malware and 346 normal
Apps. Partial permissions and their percentages in two types are listed in
Tab. 2. The percentage is calculated by the number of permission divide the
number of Apps in normal or malware.
Table 2: Partial of permissions and their percentages in two types
Permission Percent in malware (%) Percent in normal (%)
ACCESS WIFI STATE 26.81 43.93
CHANGE WIFI STATE 12.29 27.17
BROADCAST PACKAGE REMOVED 2.38 0
CONTROL LOCATION UPDATES 1.45 0
DELETE PACKAGES 17.97 0
DEVICE POWER 1.98 0
INTERNAL SYSTEM WINDOW 2.77 0
UNINSTALL SHORTCUT 7.13 0
WRITE HISTORY BOOKMARKS 7.79 0
BAIDU LOCATION SERVICE 0 2.02
BROADCAST PACKAGE CHANGED 0 2.31
BROADCAST PACKAGE REPLACED 0 2.31
INTERACT ACROSS USERS FULL 0 4.34
SEND DOWNLOAD COMPLETED INTENTS 0 1.16
SYSTEM OVERLAY WINDOW 0 2.02
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By using TF-IDF we summarize some permissions with strong intentions
in Tab. 3. By analyzing those permissions with strong indications, we nally
conrm 35 sensitive APIs, e.g., android.telephony.SmsManager.sendDataMessage,
android.telephony.SmsManager.sendMultipartTextMessage,
android.telephony.SmsManager.sendTextMessage, android.content.ContentResolver.query,
et al. Those sensitive APIs will contribute to complex networks modeling.
Table 3: Permission with strong indications
Permission intends to malware Permission intends to normal
UNINSTALL SHORTCUT INTERACT ACROSS USERS FULL
WRITE HISTORY BOOKMARKS BROADCAST PACKAGE REPLACED
INTERNAL SYSTEM WINDOW BAIDU LOCATION SERVICE
CONTROL LOCATION UPDATES SYSTEM OVERLAY WINDOW
Relying Alg. 1 and sensitive APIs, we further rene a graph that contains
function calling relations, removes safe SDK and advertisement nodes, edges
that link one or both nodes related to sensitive APIs are labeled a specic
weight, namely, 2. The output of Alg. 1 is a le named edge.dot that saves all
edges and nodes. To create a complex network, we propose Alg. 2 that takes
as input edge.dot to output a le on complex networks data. The algorithm
denotes sensitive APIs as leaf nodes and inverses source nodes within 5 layers
for complex networks. The sample is illustrated in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5.
Fig. 4: original graph
The visual exchange is shown in Tab. 4. The left table on edge informa-
tion matches Fig. 4 and right table matches Fig. 5.
Layer depth is 5 is due to following reasons: 1) retain the features about
calling sensitive APIs in malware, and 2) reduce the combine probability
with sensitive APIs in normal App.
The graph we created by using Alg. 1 and Alg. 2 is complex networks,
because the graph matches the features of complex networks such as 1) short
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Algorithm 2 Construction of complex networks
Input: edge:dot
Output: cplx ntw:dot
1: if edge.weight==2 then
2: vector  edge:targetinedge:dot
3: end if
4: i = 4
5: function ConstCN(vector)
6: for each node from vector do
7: while i > 0&&edge:source! = empty() do
8: new vector  edge:source; //new-built vector, dierent from
the previous
9: put The edge into cplx ntw.dot;
10: ConstCN(vector);
11: i  ;
12: end while
13: end for
14: i = 4;
15: edge:source ori;
16: eged:source newvector;
17: put The edge into cplx ntw.dot;
18: end function
Fig. 5: complex graph
path lengths, 2) scale-free and 3) power-law degree distributions. Tab. 5
lists some sample data from original graph, simplied graph, and complex
networks. The rst column in Tab. 5 is sample name. The second and third
columns are original node number (ONN) and original edge number (OEN).
The fourth and fth columns are simplied graph node number (SNN) and
simplied graph edge number (SEN) by calling Alg. 1. It shows that Alg. 1
is useful to simplify the graph. The sixth and seventh columns are network
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Table 4: From original graph to complex networks.
label weight source targe
1 2 2 1
2 1 4 2
3 1 6 2
4 1 6 3
5 1 7 6
6 1 6 5
7 1 8 6
8 1 8 7
9 1 9 8
10 1 10 9
ID label weight source targe
1 1 2 2 1
2 2 1 4 2
3 4 1 6 2
4 5 1 7 6
5 6 1 8 6
6 7 1 8 7
7 9 1 9 8
8 0 1 origin 4
9 0 1 origin 8
10 0 1 origin 9
node number (NNN) and network edge number(NEN) by calling Alg. 2.
It shows that node number and edge number decrease again. The last 3
columns in Tab. 5 are features of networks: average degree (AD), average
clustering coecient (ACC), and average path length (APL).
Table 5: Some simple's features about complex network
Sample label ONN OEN SNN SEN NNN NEN AD ACC APL
1 204 418 192 390 41 58 1.415 0.039 3.021
2 387 811 373 753 82 139 1.695 0.027 3.259
3 394 819 378 731 104 156 1.500 0.031 3.252
4 425 968 386 827 65 93 1.431 0.026 3.144
5 656 1627 562 1399 126 188 1.492 0.021 3.287
6 711 1749 689 1521 236 324 1.373 0.024 3.272
7 2494 6616 2035 5788 308 429 1.597 0.036 3.331
8 4585 12708 3148 6290 317 427 1.347 0.033 3.168
We observe that the average path length is much less than sample net-
work edge number, and this matches the feature on short path length in
complex networks. Fig. 6 shows that network degree distribution matches
power-law degree distribution. Base on above observation, we claim that
our created networks are complex networks, and we may apply features of
complex networks to detect malware.
4.4.3. Sensitive API n-gram constructing and vector creating
This section explains how to obtain sensitive API n-gram from App com-
plex networks. Firstly, we dene what is sensitive API n-gram.
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Fig. 6: Degree distribution of 4 samples.
Denition 3. In complex networks, if there exist identical nodes among the
paths from original node to distinct sensitive API nodes within the depth
less than 5 layers, those dierent sensitive APIs construct a sensitive API's
n-gram.
Base on above denition and the le named cplx ntw.dot, we propose
Alg. 3 as follows:
Base on Alg. 3, if there exist some paths from original node to sensitive
API nodes, and there exist identical nodes in those paths, we can collect
those sensitive APIs into n-gram, where n represents the number of sensitive
APIs. In the Fig. 7, there are 3 paths from original node to sensitive API
nodes (node 1, node 2, node 3). Because branch 1 and branch 2 are two
dierent nodes, and in the paths from original to node 2 and node 3 there
exist same node - branch 2, we say that node 1 is sensitive API 1-gram or
1-gram, and node 2 and node 3 are called 2-gram.
Base on Alg. 3, we can obtain App sensitive n-gram features. We extract
757 malware and 356 normal App's sensitive n-gram features and use TF-
IDF to get some n-gram sequences that have the greatest dierence between
those two types of Apps. In Tab. 6 there exist some functions in n-gram
sequences, and each function represents more than one sensitive APIs. There
are 22 functions and we can nally form 242 n-gram sequences from those
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Algorithm 3 Extraction n-gram sequence
Input: cplx ntw:dot
Output: n gram:dot
1: if edge.weight==2 then
2: vector  edge.target in cplx ntw:dot;
3: end if
4: for each nodei in vector do
5: Listi value  noeds on the road from ori to nodei, in the order by
layer;
6: Listi key  nodei;
7: end for
8: for each Listi do
9: add nodei to n-grami;
10: for eachListj do
11: if have common element between Listi and Listj then
12: add nodej to n-grami;
13: end if
14: end for
15: put n-grami into n-gram:dot;
16: end for
Fig. 7: Sensitive API n-gram:[(node 1)(node 2,node 3)]. Here (node 1) is 1-gram and
(node 2,node 3) are 2-gram
function combinations, and those n-gram sequences are stored in the le
named ngftr.txt.
After extracting n-gram from an App, we further extract features with
respect to complex networks including average degree, average clustering co-
ecient, and average path length. The complex networks is create by Alg. 1
and Alg. 2 from the graph created by FlowDroid. After all required features
are available, we create a vector containing those n-gram features and com-
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Table 6: The functions in n-gram from complex networks
Label Type Argument 1 Argument 2 Argument 3 Argument 4
1
1-gram
delete function
2 call telephone function
3 send message
4 capture broadcast
5
2-gram
Send short message
read short message
6 le access
7 access address list
8 receive broadcast
9 get location information
10
send by internet
read short message
11 le access
12 access address list
13 receive broadcast
14 get location information
15 capture broadcast
16 call telephone access address list
17 capture broadcast send broadcast
18
3-gram send by internet
equipment's IMEI equipment's IMSI
19 receive restart broadcast read short message
20 receive restart broadcast get location information
21
4-gram send by internet
read short message access address list call telephone
22 get location information equipment's IMEI equipment's IMSI
plex network features. That is, V ector ::= (g1; g2; g3; ::::::gn; D; J; L;M=N),
where gi (i = 1; 2; :::; n) are n-gram features; If the App has this feature, gi
will be set as 1; Otherwise, it is 0; D is average degree; J is average clustering
coecient; L is average path length; M represents \malware"; N represents
\normal". In the enhancement experiments, vector information are feeded
into WEKA to train detection model and accuracy results are evaluated.
4.4.4. Experiment Evaluation
We use WEKA to train model by vector information from 8364 malware
and 5318 normal Apps. Those vectors contain n-gram features, complex net-
work features, and App type in terms of \M" or \N". In the experiments,
we use K cross validation to obtain the average accuracy of the proposed
method. Tab. 7 lists detection performance in terms of Time, True Positive
(TP) rate, False Positive (FP) rate, Precision, Recall, and Receiver Operat-
ing Characteristic Curve (ROC) by evaluating 5 dierent machine learning
methods with 10 cross validation in WEKA.
From Tab. 7, we observe that the accuracy of 5 machine learning methods
are all accepted, since all TPRs are greater than 0.94 and all FPRs are lower
than 0.06 (all ROCs approach 1). Among them, J48 and NavieBayes cost
less time and Random Forest and Bagging cost more time. But, TPRs of
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Table 7: The results of dierent machine learning methods
Algorithm Time(s) TP Rate FP Rate Precision Recall ROC
J48 2.49 0.961 0.048 0.961 0.961 0.974
RandomForest 18.74 0.963 0.038 0.963 0.963 0.992
SMO 14.45 0.945 0.052 0.946 0.945 0.946
NaiveBayes 0.23 0.942 0.06 0.942 0.942 0.98
Bagging 11.64 0.965 0.045 0.965 0.965 0.985
J48, RandomForest and Bagging are all greater than 0.96. Thus, J48 is the
best method to this vector data set in WEKA.
To justify our method, we choose the same data as in the paper written by
N. Peiravian et al. [21]. The data performs as a benchmark in comparisons,
which are shown in Tab. 8. Perm represents the permission information in
AndroidManifest.xml, API represents API calling graph features, and Com+
represents combinative features with both Perm and API.
Table 8: The benchmark data
Data Set Algorithm Precision Recall
Perm J48 0.898 0.866
API J48 0.894 0.903
Com+ J48 0.906 0.928
Perm Bagging 0.92 0.882
API Bagging 0.936 0.907
Com+ Bagging 0.949 0.941
Comparison results with benchmark data are depicted in Fig. 8. It
shows that our proposed method outperforms others in terms of accuracy in
the detection of malware.
5. Experiment and Performance Evaluation
5.1. Module Evaluation
As an integral system with multiple modules, we prefer to evaluate the
performance of individual component rst and then evaluate the overall per-
formance. The major function modules to be tested include crawling module,
feature extraction module, classier module, and repackage detection mod-
ule.
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Fig. 8: Performance comparison in accuracy with benchmarks
5.1.1. App crawling module test
In this module, we examine whether the designed crawling program can
download Apps so fast as to sense and monitor third-party App markets
(Wandoujia market1, Mumayi market2, Anzhi market3, Android market4 and
Huawei market5), which are 5 most popular Android markets in China. The
speed of downloading under normal PC client is about 0.4 Mbps at rst,
which certainly is not suitable for large-scale App analysis. We next de-
ploy our system at clouds, it then can reach nearly 1.6 Mbps downloading
throughput, e.g., obtaining 3GB data in half an hour. The downloading
speed in clouds is four times faster than that in PC end.
5.1.2. App feature extraction module test
In this module test, we mainly test n-gram feature extraction and GLCM-
6 feature extraction. For n-gram test, we test the performance of two steps:
Decompile APK les, and Get n-gram features.
It takes 37 minutes to decompile 100 sample APK les rstly. It seems
not to be ecient. After analyzing the reason, we observe that the decompile
speed is related to APK size. If APKs that are larger than 100M are removed,
the speed of decompiling increases from 2.7 APKs/min to 4~5 APKs/min.
1https://www.wandoujia.com/
2url=http://www.mumayi.com/
3url=http://www.anzhi.com/
4url=http://apk.hiapk.com/
5url=http://app.hicloud.com/
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After decompiling the APK le, we further test n-gram feature extraction
performance. Our experiments spend 1500s to process 1000 malware samples
for extracting n-gram features. In experimental results we nd there exist
some n-gram feature les with size less than 1k, which indicates that feature
extraction is unsuccessful. We further analyze the reason - heads of some
APKs are damaged in decompiling procedure in Windows.
Some features we obtained (e.g., 18 3-gram features from one n-gram le)
in this module test are shown in Tab. 9.
Table 9: 3-gram features extracted from normal Apps
MGR GRG RGT GIP IPT PTV
TVP VPP PPM PMT MTP TPM
PMV MVM VMI MII IIG IGI
5.1.3. App classier module test
To build training set, we choose 1495 App samples including 754 malicious
Apps and 741 normal ones to extract n-gram features and GLCM-6 values.
We label them with \Normal" or \Malware", and write them into CSV format
le. After that, the data in training set are processed by WEKA, in which
a classier can be created nally. Above procedure takes about 270 seconds
in the experiments. It shows that after ten-fold cross validation, TP rate of
the model is 0.989 and FP rate is 0.054, it justies that the classier model
has high accuracy for detecting malware.
To classify unknown APKs, we build a testing set by including 200 mal-
ware and normal samples collected from online BBS. The establishment of
the testing set is similar to the training set, except that the former excludes
the attribute label (\Normal" and \Malware"). We can classify the test-
ing set by using classier model, whose results will be compared with BBS
declaration manually, to evaluate the accuracy of the classier. The experi-
mental results are given in Fig. 9, in which there are 5 columns - The rst
column displays sample sequences; The second column indicates actual class
of sample (because we exclude attribution labels in the test set, all they
are 1 :?, where 1 presents default label and ? presents actual label); The
third column outputs predicted results by using classier model (\Normal"
or \Malware"); The fourth line shows whether there are some errors (nothing
showed) or not; The fth column presents the probability of predict results
that is in the range of 0~1.
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By checking the results manually, our system can achieve an accuracy
with nearly 98.5% in detecting malware.
Fig. 9: The results of classication by classier model.
5.1.4. Repackaging detection module test
In this module test, SSDEEP is selected to provide fuzzy hash algorithm
to get an App's ngerprint, which is shown in Tab. 10. The rst line shows
the brief information of the results, which are blocksize, hash, hash, and le
name.
Table 10: The ngerprint of App by using ssdeep
ssdeep,1.1{blocksize:hash:hash,lename
196008:
Xvm3WGPKh/kOiCb6Mm05Y0YjM81F+RAaCbLm7w2BV:
sWGC6RKY0Y71F+0DmLiw2BV,/Users/idFTPClienttestnew.zip
Some comparison results by using SSDEEP's command \-m"and judge-
ment on App certication are given in Tab. 11 and Tab. 12. In the former
table, there exist multiple Apps possessing identical certicates, and the
similarity is 100%. Those Apps are the same from one publisher, and are
compiled for many times. In the latter table, there exist multiple Apps that
hold low similarity (lower than 50%) but possess the same certicate. The
reason is due to the dierent versions of the same App. Sometimes there exist
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some Apps that match with others with similarity more than 95%, although
they do not hold the same certicate. Such situation can be reasoned from
two aspects as follows: 1) Either or both is (are) repackaged; 2) A number
of same third-party libraries are called in source code of both Apps.
Table 11: Some Apps have same certicates with others
Number of App Similarity with others If have same cert
No.0
matches No.2 49%
matches No.11 100% same cert
matches No.21 50%
matches No.25 49%
matches No.30 100% same cert
matches No.181 100% same cert
Table 12: Some App is lower similarity with other App but have same cert with other App
Number of App Similarity with others If have same cert
N0.7
matches No.259 54%
matches No.287 38% same cert
matches No.290 49% same cert
matches No.291 54% same cert
In the experiments, 340 malware samples include 50 repackage samples
are included. The repackage module detects 48 repackaged samples among
50, which justies the repackage detection method is sound.
5.2. Integral Evaluation
We conduct the cloud-based real-time monitoring on large-scale Apps in
this section. Malware situational awareness curve will be created, shown,
updated for App markets with multiple applications, e.g., massive ltering,
supervision, risk management, trend alter and so on. It can also be provided
as a third-party service for network governance. Fig. 10 depicts malware
trends in 3 mainstream markets for a given period. It shows that in those 3
markets from April 23 to April 29, 2017, there exist some new malware that
are detected by our proposed system but not aware by App markets.
A risk assessment on App markets are also sorted for ve major markets.
The metrics is based on the proportion of malware and repackaged applica-
tions in the market, which is normalized into a score range in [0,100]. The
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Fig. 10: Malicious code trends.
results (Fig. 11) shows that all scores are not high. It means that in those
markets there exist contain malware or repackaged applications that are not
detected.
Fig. 11: The risk assessment for major App markets.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a comprehensive system that can automatically
crawl Android Apps and detect malware in a large-scale at real-time. The
features of App are extracted by n-gram and GLCM-6 values. Fuzzy hash
algorithm is utilized for detecting repackag. The model of complex networks
are applied for extracting characteristics in calling function graph. The de-
tection accuracy of our system is evaluated over a large amount of Apps
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crawled from top 5 popular App markets in China. The results validate the
scalability of our system. Our system can detect malware in those markets
unaware. Moreover, it can evaluate the risk of those markets in portion of
malware.
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